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Abstract: This essay wants to rescue the concept of phaneroscopy, created by Charles Sanders Peirce, to adapt it in a 
phenomenological condition of multiple realities. Therefore, in addition to review the reflection of Peirce, we visited the 
approach of phenomenology of multiple realities proposed by Alfred Schutz in his reading of William James. The idea is 
to seek a phenomenology that goes beyond the human consciousness to other research subjects. 




It is clear that, for phenomenology, the 
important thing is not the world that exists but the way 
the knowledge of the world is given to each. However, 
does this phenomenological subject needs to be the 
human conscience? Can we not extend this 
philosophical reflection field? 
 
This essay wants to rescue the concept of 
phaneroscopy, created by Charles Sanders Peirce, to 
adapt it in a phenomenological condition of multiple 
realities. Therefore, in addition to review the reflection 
of Peirce, we visited the approach of phenomenology of 
multiple realities proposed by Alfred Schutz in his 
reading of William James. The idea is to seek a 
phenomenology that goes beyond the human 
consciousness to other research subjects. 
 
Through the condition of multiple realities, the 
phaneroscopy can address the experienced multiplicities 
of subjects that have similarities to the human 
consciousness, such as animals (which have the ability 
to represent as humans do) and objects of culture 
(which can build own realities around them, a fact 
exemplified by the representative action of fictions). 
 
C. S. Peirce’s phaneron and phaneroscopy 
In Peirce's “Adirondack Lectures”, we can 
found that “phaneroscopy is the description of 
the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean the 
collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense 
present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it 
corresponds to any real thing or not” (CP 1.284) [1]. 
 
Therefore, as De Tienne points out, “The 
phaneron is a continuum permeated with generality, and 
its individuality stems only from its being the conflation 
of a particular mind with the objective world. Each 
individual mind lives one phaneron, and there are as 
many phanera as there are individual minds (be they 
human or otherwise: animals, for instance, are also 
“phaneral beings,” even though their capacity to pass 
from self-presentation to other-representation appears 
more limited than ours)”. [2] 
 
Taking a 180º turn in Husserl’s thought, Peirce 
showed, by phaneroscopy, a negative type of 
phenomenology. If in Husserl, we found a Descartes-
like concern with rational universality, in Peirce, we can 
follow an empirical individualism. This kind of 
phenomenology opens itself to criticism of many orders 
like the one made by Hookway: “There is a difficulty 
about coming to grips with Peirce’s phenomenological 
writings which reflects a fundamental feature of the 
discipline itself. He stresses that phenomenology does 
not issue in a body of accepted propositions; there is not 
a community of phenomenologists adding to the stock 
of shared knowledge, publishing reasoned conclusions, 
and so on. Each individual must be his own 
phenomenologist (…). In line with this, Peirce’s own 
discussions are extremely allusive (…). In the end, the 
reader must decide for himself whether these hints 
enable him successfully to carry out a 
phenomenological inquiry and agree with Peirce’s 
categorial doctrine” [3]. 
 
But De Tienne, among others, counter-
arguments that criticism with arguments which show 
that Peirce describes a different kind of science: “To 
begin with, the fact Peirce did not call the science of the 
phaneron by the name of “phanero-logy” (except in one 
fleeting instance), but by that of “phanero-scopy,” is 
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certainly significant. The suffix -scopy introduces the 
idea of observation, while the suffix -logy introduces 
the idea of discourse, a corpus of systematized 
arguments. This distinction is crucial to understand the 
rôle of phaneroscopy, and is found in many different 
guises throughout the writings. For instance, Peirce says 
that “in Phenomenology there is no assertion except that 
there are certain seemings; . . . Phenomenology can 
only tell the reader which way to look and to see what 
he shall see” (CP 2.197, 1902). Elsewhere he writes that 
phaneroscopy “does not undertake, but sedulously 
avoids, hypothetical explanations of any sort. It simply 
scrutinizes the direct appearances. . . . The student’s 
great effort is . . . to confine himself to honest, single-
minded observation of the appearances” (CP 1.287, 
1905). Phaneroscopy is a work of observation: it 
“studies” what seems but does not “state” what appears, 
does not make assertions. Assertions are judgments 
“about” something, and they usually attribute to those 
something different qualities, such as reality or 
unreality, and truth or falsity. The phaneroscopist 
refrains from making such judgments. He only 
acknowledges the manifest qua manifest. The auxiliary 
verb of his assertions is not to be but to seem. There is 
“little reasoning,” for reasoning is a matter of reaching 
conclusions from premisses, and observation of the 
phaneron does not start from premisses. Peirce insists 
on the purity of that observation, which stems from the 
fact that phaneroscopists must make sure not to 
incorporate in their observation anything foreign to it, 
such as preconceived interpretations. Phanero-“scopy” 
must be “honest” and “single-minded,” as well as direct 
and keen. This might sound pretty much Husserlian if it 
was not for the important difference that phaneroscopy 
has no interest in defining the intentional characteristics 
of different modes of consciousness, since for the 
phaneroscopist “there is no difference in the 
presentations themselves” (CP 7.644, 1903). Anything 
can be part of the phaneron, “in any sense or in any 
way,” because whatever the sense or the way, they are 
not the phaneroscopists’ business. They do not 
speculate about what self-presents: they merely observe 
it” [2]. 
 
And phaneroscopy must have a method which 
is totally different of the one put forward by Husserl 
and other phenomenologists. After all, as Peirce noted, 
the very nature of phaneron as a phenomenon is 
different from the Husserlian one: “What 
phenomenology does is to distinguish certain very 
general elements of phenomena, render them distinct, 
and study their possible modes.... The work of 
discovery . . . consists in disentangling, or drawing out, 
from human thought, certain threads that run through it, 
and in showing what marks each has that distinguishes 
it from every other. (R 693: 62–64, 1904; also in NEM 
IV: 196) [T]he results of phaneroscopy are obtained by 
the mere observation, generalization, and analyses, of 
matters of common experience, always present to us. 
These are as capable of repetition, comparison, etc. as 
are the operations of mathematics. (RL 427: 10, CSP–
C. A. Strong, 25 July 1904)” [2].  
 
So, phaneroscopy become a possibility of an 
Analytic counterpart of phenomenology with a method 
which dialogs with the philosophy of its time like 
Logical Atomism or even the mathematical tradition in 
philosophy within the Vienna Circle. “These operations 
can only be conducted through the medium of a 
diagram. This is exceedingly important, as far as 
phaneroscopy is concerned. Observing a phaneron is 
not a matter of introspection. It needs to be projected, as 
it were, in a form that is least likely to disrupt or betray 
it. Such a form can only be iconic, but iconic in a 
sophisticated fashion. Peirce’s work on existential 
graphs convinced him that these graphs furnished the 
best conceivable model of diagrammatization. He was 
so convinced of this that at times he spoke as though 
existential graphs as he defined them were the very 
diagrams needed to analyze and describe the 
constituents of the phaneron. It appears to me; however, 
that what Peirce really meant was that phaneroscopy 
had to come up with diagrams that mimicked the 
existential graphs while remaining distinct from them. 
His argument to that effect was by analogy. Just as the 
Sheet of Assertion can be used by the logician to 
diagram the contents of the logical Quasi-Mind, in the 
same way a Sheet of Description can be used to 
diagram the contents of the Phaneron, the Phaneron 
being defined as the “collective whole of all that could 
ever be present to the mind in any way or in any 
sense”” [2]. 
 
William James and Alfred Schutz: Phenomenology 
of multiple realities 
If phaneroscopy is the possibility of a 
counterpoint of the Phenomenology from the Analytic 
Philosophy, we need to update the concept analytically. 
Thus, the notion of multiple realities needs to come 
from the analytical field. We chose here reading by 
Alfred Schutz, famous Epistemologist of the 
Phenomenology, the best known book by William 
James. “In a famous chapter of his Principles of 
Psychology William James analyzes our sense of 
reality.' Reality, so he states, means simply relation to 
our emotional and active life. The origin of all reality is 
subjective, whatever excites and stimulates our interest 
is real. To call a thing real means that this thing stands 
in a certain relation to ourselves” [4]. 
 
To William James, “there are several, probably 
an infinite number of various orders of realities, each 
with its own special and separate style of existence. 
James calls them "sub-universes" and mentions as 
examples the world of sense or physical things (as the 
paramount reality); the world of science; the world of 
ideal relations; the world of "idols of the tribe"; the 
various supernatural worlds of mythology and religion; 
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the various worlds of individual opinion; the worlds of 
sheer madness and vagary” [4]. 
 
However, the main feature that allows us to 
call this condition as “multiple realities” is that “the 
popular mind conceives of all these sub-worlds more or 
less disconnectedly; and when dealing with one of them 
forgets for the time being its relations to the rest. But 
every object we think of is at last referred to one of 
these sub- worlds. "Each world whilst it is attended to is 
real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses with 
the attention” [4]. 
 
For Alfred Schutz, “all these worlds-the world 
of dreams, of imageries and phantasms, especially the 
world of art, the world of religious experience, the 
world of scientific contemplation, the play world of the 
child, and the world of the insane-are finite provinces of 
meaning. This means that (a) all of them have a peculiar 
cognitive style (although not that of the world of 
working with the natural attitude); (b) all experiences 
within each of these worlds are, with respect to this 
cognitive style, consistent in themselves and compatible 
with one another (although not compatible with the 
meaning of everyday life); (c) each of these finite 
provinces of meaning may receive a specific accent of 
reality (although not the reality accent of the world of 
working)” [4]. 
 
Therefore, “the world of working in daily life 
is the archetype of our experience of reality. All the 
other provinces of meaning may be considered as its 
modification” [4]. All realities are analogous to it. So, 
“"World of daily life" shall mean the intersubjective 
world which existed long before our birth, experienced 
and interpreted by others, our prede- cessors, as an 
organized world. Now it is given to our experience and 
interpretation. All interpretation of this world is based 
upon a stock of previous experiences of it, our own 
experiences and those handed down to us by our parents 
and teachers, which in the form of "knowledge at hand" 
function as a scheme of reference” [4]. 
 
This puts the phenomenology of multiple 
realities as a thorough analysis of the experiences of 
lived life. “To this stock of experiences at hand belongs 
our knowledge that the world we live in is a world of 
well circumscribed objects with definite qualities, 
objects among which we move, which resist us and 
upon which we may act. To the natural attitude the 
world is not and never has been a mere aggregate of 
colored spots, incoherent noises, centers of warmth and 
cold” [4]. 
 
Therefore, “philosophical or psychological 
analysis of the constitution of our experiences may 
afterwards, retrospectively, describe how elements of 
this world affect our senses, how we passively perceive 
them in an indistinct and confused way, how by active 
apperception our mind singles out certain features from 
the perceptional field, conceiving them as well 
delineated things which stand out over against a more 
or less inarticulated background or horizon” [4].  
 
So our aim of an update phaneroscopy needs to 
take into account not only the description-like 
philosophical method, as Peirce said, but also the bulk 
of lived experiences. After all, “the world of everyday 
life is the scene and also the object of our actions and 
interactions” [4]. 
 
Phaneroscopy of multiple realities 
As Peirce states, [t]he results of phaneroscopy 
are obtained by the mere observation, generalization, 
and analyses, of matters of common experience, always 
present to us. These are as capable of repetition, 
comparison, etc. as are the operations of mathematics. 
(RL 427: 10, CSP–C. A. Strong, 25 July 1904)” [2]. 
 
This mathematical precision mentioned by 
Peirce leads us to consider the role of phaneroscopy to 
take the place of phenomenology in what Husserl calls 
"geometry of the vivid” [5]. Thus, phaneroscopy can 
take the place of phenomenological analysis of 
everything that lives or is the result of any living thing. 
 
It is still necessary to build a method for 
phaneroscopy and we believe that the phenomenology 
of multiple realities is the main way for this. After all, 
what lives builds these multiplicities, a real world of 
experiences around it. 
 
At first, we can think of two alternatives. As 
said before in this essay, one is inspired by the 
reflections of own Charles Sanders Peirce: existential 
graphs [1]. The other found reflection posed by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein: language games [6]. 
 
In a previous work, we showed that there are 
possible links between Peirce and Wittgenstein through 
the concept that inspires the language game idea: the 
satzsystem [7]. Satzsystem, in Middle Wittgenstein 
ideas, “indicates the logical space of the definition of 
something.  That is made through the operations made 
by the truth functions and their own logical necessity. 
That is the moment when we see this essay’s point: that 
Tractatus’ Wittgenstein is not totally different from 
Investigations’ Wittgenstein.  And,  the  curious thing is 
that what separates the two Wittgenstein –that is, the 
medium phase with the lectures and conversations with 
the Vienna  Circle –is  what  binds  them  together  in  a  
single  way  of  thinking” [7].   
 
In this reasoning, the construction of the minds 
of phenomenological study elements beyond human 
consciousness also involves the study of language. 
Language that we understand as the true builder of 
realities and the only way to reflect vivid experiences. 
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With the point of view of language games, 
phenomenological interpretations put by Heidegger [8] 
and Sartre [9], for example, describe the language game 
set in motion by the ontological being. It must now 
perform the philosophical endeavor posed by 
phaneroscopy to seek phenomenology of other 
consciousnesses beyond human. 
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